CORPORATE MORTGAGE BONDS AND
MAJORITY CLAUSES DE FOREST BILLYOU t IT has long been accepted that secured creditors of a corporation may not always enforce their security in conformity with terms previously accepted by the borrower. 1 Since 1879 English and Canadian indentures have frequently contained provisions, commonly called majority clauses, enabling a specified percentage of the security holders to modify the rights of the class, including the principal and interest obligation of the corporate debtor. 2 Their use has become so common that a commentator on the English practice states that ". . . the draftsman who omits to insert some such provision runs the risk of being accused of neglecting the best interests of the debenture [holderl . . .
With rare exceptions, majority clauses allowing modification of the principal and interest obligations of a corporate debtor were not accepted in the United States until recent insistence by the ICC that they be included in the new mortgages of railroads emerging from Section 77 reorganization. The Commission, in addition, has pressed for enactment of a statute which, in effect, would incorporate such a clause in most railroad obligations. There is at least inadequate understanding of the incidents and operation of such clauses in the United States. This article seeks to ameliorate the inadequacy.
ENGLISH AND CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
The source of the English and Canadian majority clauses can probably be traced to clauses included in a trust deed prepared by Francis Beaufort Palmer in 1879 4 and, two years later, reproduced in a revision of his compilation of Company Precedents. Soon thereafter such clauses appeared in many English and Canadian trust deeds and indentures. 6 t Member of the New York Bar.
As cases involving the use or attempted use of these clauses were decided, and new problems or possibilities foreseen, the clause was modified so that today in England and in Canada it is possible, under an appropriately drafted clause, 7 for debenture holder majorities to authorize the creation of a prior lien, 8 and the exchange of a secured obligation for an equity interest 9 and to assent to a thorough reorganization with no provision for dissenters other than pro rata participation. 1 " The courts, however, have been vigilant to see that the attempted action is clearly in conformity with the indenture provision," that those casting votes are motivated by interests of the class and not by adverse interests 12 or collateral matters," and that subsequent corporate action purporting to be in conformity with the resolution does in fact so conform. 14 
UNITED STATES EXPERIENCE
Prior to 1930 majority clauses permitting modification of principal and interest obligations of the debtor saw relatively little use in the United States, 15 and today, as then, the typical indenture expressly provides that the corporate obligation to pay principal and interest 7 . For recent English and Canadian forms of the clause see 3 PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS 292-3, 355-60 (15th ed. 1938 138-43 (1936 12. In re New York Taxicab Co., [1913] 1 Ch. 1 (1912) (sale of corporate assets authorized by debenture holders, proceeds to be used to purchase those debentures tendered to the company at the lowest prices, enjoined).
13. British America Nickel Corp. v. M. J. O'Brien, Ltd., [1927] A.C. 369 (vote cast for the best interest of the voting security holder and not for the best interest of the voting class).
14. Re B. C. Portland Cement Co., [1915] Failure to accept the English type of majority clause in the United States may be attributed to several factors. The New York Stock Exchange has been reluctant to grant listing to bonds subject to modification as to principal or interest," and the negotiable character of such bonds in each of the forty-eight states is not entirely clear.b' This combination of circumstances deterred large issuers from proposing, and bankers from underwriting, securities subject to such clauses. 1 " This in turn may have set a style followed by smaller issuers. The difference in attitude is carried so far that Canadian securities, while normally subject to such a clause, if intended to be sold or listed in the United States are devoid of majority clauses. ' Our courts, in the few decided cases, have indicated that under an appropriately drafted clause the same possibilities are available to bondholder majorities as in England and Canada, 2 but subject to similar restrictions. have summarized the provision on the bond itself 24 and have not relied on a mere general clause referring to the mortgage. As a result a purchaser is placed on notice of the possibility of past modification.
However, wheri the scope of majority action is broader, such as providing for reduction of principal and exchange of securities, a situation where a draftsman has less reason to be confident as to compliance with NIL standards, bonds have usually contained little other than conventional reference clauses.
2 5 In such cases it would be difficult to hold a purchaser 'subsequent to, and without notice of, modification, to the terms of the modification. The obligor would be faced with the general problem of estoppel based on the attitude that bond clauses referring in general terms to the mortgage are deemed to refer to the mortgage only for the purpose of disclosing details of security rights. 20 If such a purchaser should not be bound to the proposal the whole attempt at modification might be a failure, unless the form of assent were sufficiently broad. To avoid preferential treatment, a court might well find the assent was only to those modifications that would be binding on all subsequent as well as present bondholders. , The most thorough consideration to date given to the negotiable character, under American law, of bonds subject to majority action, has probably taken place in drafting the new mortgages of railroads now emerging from proceedings under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act. Commencing in 1942, the Interstate Commerce Commission, purportedly dissatisfied with then contemporary reorganization procedure, sought to lay a groundwork for easing future financial difficulties and for avoiding reorganizations. 45 In approving reorganization plans for these emerging roads it directed that the new mortgages contain clauses permitting extension of the principal and interest obligations by action of specified bondholder majorities.-" Objections were made to the Commission that provision for extensions unlimited in time might impair negotiability, and it then limited the extendable period. 47 Mortgages subsequently executed have typically provided that by the vote of holders of three-quarters of the outstanding bonds there may be postponement of payment of (1) principal for not in excess of twenty years, and (2) interest payments for not in excess of (a) 79 (mimeo. 1947) .
Where application has been made by solvent companies for authority for the issue and sale of bonds the Commission has not suggested that such clauses be included in the new mortgages. E.g. Pittsburg, Bessemer & Lake Erie R. Bonds, Fin. Doc. No. 15529 (mimeo. 1946) . However, the suggestion has been made, in connection with application for authorization of securities proposed to be issued on termination of receivership proceedings. E.g. 223, 225-6, 235 (1944 In the reorganization or salvaging of real estate properties in the thirties several companies emerged with debts secured by instruments subject to majority action. 0 This was attributed to dissatisfaction with the then existing reorganization facilities and the belief that these modification provisions of the indentures would facilitate future adjustment. 5 Under some clauses a specified majority could permit the elimination of bondholders' liens, the sale of property, the extension of bond maturities, the reduction of interest or consummation of sweeping plans of reorganization-all on a purely voluntary basis. 2 Since all this could be accomplished without either judicial examination or approval, 5 3 the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1936 expressed its fear that unsupervised reorganization under such clauses imperiled minorities. 54 This concern about the potentialities of majority clauses led to provision in the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 that indentures to Grande mortgage makes no provision for extension of principal. It provides for extension of interest and limits extended unpaid fixed and contingent interest payments to, at any one time, fifteen and five per cent, respectively, of the principal of the bonds. In addition, prior to, and for the duration of, any extension, provision shall be made so bondholders may elect a majority of the Board of Directors. First Mortgage, Denver & R.G. W. R.R., Art. 19, § 3 (1947) .
The prime mortgage of the road that most recently emerged from § 77 while providing for certain types of modification, expressly provides that no modification may (a) alter or impair the obligation to pay principal or interest or (b) permit creation of a prior lien. First & Refunding Mortgage, New York N.H. & H. R. R. 121 (1947) .
In one case the mortgage executed by a road just emerging froth equity receivership provides that by vote of holders of two-thirds of the bonds payment of not in excess of ten semi-annual interest installments may be postponed to any specified or determinable date not later than maturity date of principal. First Mortgage, Seaboard Air Line R.R., Art. 16, §6 (1946 While the indenture may also contain provisions whereby a majority of security holders might, on behalf of a class, preclude the exercise of remedies available to the trustee for the benefit of that class §316(a) (1) of their claims before equity interests may participate in the reorganized company, 61 a requirement incorporated into some of the federal reorganization statutes. 6 2 Supreme Court decisions of the last decade have been such that equity interests are on notice that in bankruptcy reorganization their claims are to be satisfied only after satisfaction of the claims of senior creditors. 63 Inherent in the nature of majority clauses is the fact that, save for what interests stockholders might be motivated to surrender voluntarily, the clauses provide a method for modification of creditor rights without curtailment of stockholder interests, 4 (1940) . "The hope of securing an arrangement [under Chapter xi] which is fair and equitable and in the best interest of unsecured creditors, without some readjustment of the rights of stockholders such as . . . is precluded by Chapter xr, is at best but negligible, and, if accomplished at all, must be without the aids to protection of creditors and the public interest which are provided by Chapter x, and which would seem to be indispensable to a just determination whether the plan is fair and equitable." Id. at 453.
65. Dodd, supra note 64, at 748-9 (1940). 66. Cf. Sage v. Central R.R. of Iowa, 99 U.S. 334 (1878) where, over objections of first mortgage bondholders, a foreclosure decree was upheld which contemplated purchase of the property by the first mortgage trustee and, in accordance with wishes of a majority of the bondholders expressed pursuant to provisions of the mortgage, directed conveyance of the property to a new company with stock participation being given to junior unsecured creditors and stockholders. Participation was given them without any new contribution and despite the fact that first mortgage bondholders had a $4,623,334 claim for principal and interest and for a master fund the property could sell for no more than $2,500,000. In Rothschild v. Jefferson Hotel Co., 56 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Mo. 1944) , an attempt was made to effect a plan embracing creation of a lien prior to the first mortgage coupled with payment to first mortgage bondholders of part of the principal and accrued interest, together with a junior bond for the balance of principal, with no impairment of stockholders' interests.
[Vol. 57: 595 to meet requirements of absolute priority.cS
Since it is clear that majority clauses recently adopted in this country, have been adopted for the purpose of forestalling, delaying, and avoiding insolvency and bankruptcy reorganization," and since the procedure adopted successfully avoids judicial scrutiny, 0 -the question may be asked whether judicial aid should be extended to recognize or enforce such agreements where creditors have assented in advance to modification, during periods of financial difficulty, of their rights in a manner which does not meet equitable or bankruptcy standards of priority. 7 ' One court has indicated that the priority rule might well establish a standard that should be met before a mortgage trustee might properly recommend modification of the interests of his bondholder Subsequently when confirmation of this plan was sought in 77B proceedings, the plan was altered so as to give bondholders an enlarged, and preferred, share participation (Id. at 506). The Supreme Court held that even as so modified the plan could not be approved and confirmed by a bankruptcy court. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939) .
68. Since Canadian courts have not adopted as precise a standard of fairness and equitableness as that adopted in the United States, Fraser, supra note 2, at 936, reorganization by use of majority clauses is limited only to the extent that a court "in granting its approval to any plan of reorganization would give consideration to whether the plan as a whole is such that members of the classes of security holders voting on it exercising their own judgment as members of the class could reasonably approve." Courts considering plans which allocate securities to junior interests ithout satisfaction of senior claims have considere sudch facts as the junior interests being customers of the debtor (Letter of W. Kaspar Fraser, KC., of the Ontario Bar, to the writer, July 10, 1947), consideration of which, in light of the decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 105 (1939) , would be regarded as irrelevant in the United States.
69. 57th I.C.C. ANx. REP. 76 (1943 624 (1945) where, in approving a plan which allocated securities to common stockholders without recognizing preferred stock liquidation clauses, the court observed "No possibility exists that simplification of structure is employed here to evade or nullify creditors' rights in reorganization or to take the place of traditional reorganization." Id. at 634.
Even before enactment of the bankruptcy reorganization statutes, courts declined to approve debt reduction plans which were inequitable in that stockholders surrendered nothing although as many as ninety percent of the bondholders consented. See Lake Street R1R. v. Ziegler, 99 Fed. 114 (C.C.A. 7th 1900). cestuis. 72 The Supreme Court has indicated tfiat the requirement applies to reorganization of solvent as well as insolvent companies 11 and has approvingly quoted 74 the language of an early case that, ".. . any arrangement of the parties [to reorganization proceedings] by which the subordinate rights and interests of the stockholders are attempted to be secured at the expense of the prior rights of either class of creditors comes within judicial denunciation." 75 Sufficient doubt has already arisen in this country to cause those proposing use of modification clauses, and trustees of bond issues sought to be modified, to be concerned. Their concern is not limited solely to 'consideration of compliance with formal requirements of a majority clause 76 but extends ag well to consideration of the effectiveness of action as against non-assenters 7
MAJORITY AcTION AND THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COIMISSION
In 1945 modification procedure to be applicable to the obligations of "carriers" defined in that Act s ' Justification for the Commission proposal vas based on the need for uninterrupted railroad operation, 82 but, in making it, the Commission showed scant regard for creditors' rights or for the policy of existing corporate and railroad reorganization statutes.
Under the 1945 proposal a solvent s 3 carrier could be empowered to alter or modify the provisions of a bond, note, debenture or other evidence of debt, 8 4 and the provisions of any instrument pursuant to which such evidence of debt was issued. To be so empowered, the carrier would first apply to the Commission. Following a hearing, on notice to specified classes of security holders, the Commission could(as to the original proposal, or with such amendments as the Commission should find to be "just and reasonable") make prescribed findings. 8 5 Unless the proposal were then withdrawn by the carrier it would be submitted to holders of the affected obligations ' and if the assent of holders of 75 per cent of each affected class were secured, an order would then be entered approving and authorizing the proposal and fixing a time when it should become binding on all holders of affected obligations. 84. The proposal was specifically inapplicable to equipment trust securities.
85.
Under the 1945 and 1947 proposals the Commission would be required to find that the proposed modification was (a) within the scope of the statute, (b) in the public interest, (c) in the best interests of the carrier and the holders of each class of the obligations to be affected and (d) not adverse to the interests of any creditors of the carrier not affected. If the modification should constitute "issuance of a security," as defined in §20a(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STrT. 379 (18S7), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § §1-27 (1943), the Commission would also be required to make the findings required by that section.
There was, in detail, some differences in the findings required by the 1945 and 1947 proposals. While in the earlier proposals the Commission would be required to find that the modification would "not be adverse to the interests of the holders of any other class of the carriers' securities," the 1947 proposal would not require this but would require as a further finding that the modification be in the best interests of each class of the carriers' stockholders. While the ICC proposal was applicable to solvent carriers 87 and was directed, in part, toward eliminating the "threat of financial difficulties", 88 and as a means of avoiding bankruptcy reorganization," it was also directed toward securing, in accord with the public interest, such modifications as elimination of antiquated or archaic provisions in security instruments." In this combination of purposes there is a strong similarity to the objectives of Section 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act 9 1 requiring ad6pti6n of company or commission-sponsored plans for reorganization of registered holding companies so as to secure elimination of unnecessary complexities in corporate structure, and fair and equitable distribution of voting power. 92 More significantly, the ICC proposal evinces in many ways a solicitude for equity interests not found in Section 11. This is apparent in the provisions made for (1) submission of only company-sponsored plans, 93 (2) withdrawal of any plan after Commission approval and/or amendment 94 and, what may be the most serious criticism of the proposal, (3) modification of creditors' interests with no impairment of equity interests.
The result sought by the ICC proposal, alteration of the secured or unsecured obligations of solvent carriers, has heretofore taken place only under circumstances whereby each creditor, as against junior creditors and equity interests, could insist on his contractual right, or could exchange his contractual right for what he deemed a fair equivalent 11 -a result similar to what the absolute priority rule seeks to achieve in bankruptcy reorganization. This the ICC proposal would modify, 0 allowing 75 per cent of a class of creditors to modify, for all, the con- 87. While the 1947 proposals did contemplate instances where modification would be sought of matured but unpaid obligations, such a condition, while not necessarily constituting insolvency in the equity sense, cf. First National Bank of Cincinnati v. Flershem, 290 U.S. 504 (1934) while never squarely stated by the Commission, has never been denied by them. Negatively, the proposal makes no express provision for formulation or approval of a plan which meets recognized priority requirements, 59 and, affirmatively, Commission insistence on certain features of the proposal indicates that it contemplated implementation of modifications which do not meet recognized priority requirements. The proposal would allow modification of debt "obligations", as defined.' Balloting would be only by, and a final Commission order could only affect rights of, holders of the classes of "obligations" affected. Of more significance is the Commission response to suggestions that the percentage of assenting security holders be reduced. The Commission must have been aware that under Section 11 of the Holding Company Act 101 reorganizations of solvent and insolvent companies had been effected without submission to security holders, but which gave participation to stockholders only after satisfaction of 838 (1935) , 15 U.S.C. § 79k (1943) . Under Chapter XVof the Bankruptcy Act, 56 STAT. 787, 11 U.S.C. § 1200 ct seq. (1942) the Commission was required to find that a proposed plan of adjustment vas "in the public interest and in the best interests of each class of creditors and stockholders," id. at § 1210(2) (c) (i). creditors' claims. 0 2 Nevertheless, the ICC proposal would require, in addition to conformity with other statutory requirements, the vote of holders of 75 per cent of the affected class. Commission opposition to reduction of this percentage was on the ground that the reasonableness of the legislation depended, in part, on this percentage. 0 3 Since utilization of the Holding Company Act indicates that fair and equitable reorganizations can be enforced without balloting of security holders, it seems a reasonable conclusion that the ICC by its proposal sought a constitutional or legal basis for reorganizations not of a "fair and equitable" nature. 102. Thus, where assets had a total value of $2,625,000 and there were secured claims in excess of $5,000,000, secured creditors received the new bonds and 95.76/o of the new stock. The remaining 4.249o of the stock went to unsecured creditors as pan passu distribution of free assets. Old stockholders received nothing. it re Jacksonville Gas Co., 46 F. Supp.
(S.D. Fla. 1942).
In a § 11 plan for a solvent company, cash and portfolio securities went to note and debentureholders, 95% of the new common to holders of old prior preference and, because of the likelihood of preferred stockholders participating, save for the intervention of the § 11 plan, in future earnings, they received the rest of the new stock. Old common stockholders received nothing. In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., Holding Act Release 5430 (1944); nodified and approval denied, 59 F. Supp. 274 (D. Del. 1945) ; rev'd and re-Enactment of such a proposal may be objected to on more general grounds. It can fairly be said that incorporation into all carrier securities 105 of what is essentially a majority clause would give statutory dignity to a noa-statutory procedure already having recognized dangers. It would also accord some degree of dignity to use of the nonstatutory analogue as a means of avoiding statutory reorganization with its well-considered safeguards and sanctions. Under the commerce clause, a plan of reorganization of a "public" corporation approved by an administrative body can clearly be enforced without balloting of security holders. 05 Under the bankruptcy clause, a plan of reorganization may be enforced without the approval of affected creditors.ler However, this has been true only of statutes that require plans that meet the test of fairness and equitableness.' Indeed, the Supreme Court has indicated that even though more than 90 per cent of each class of affected creditors approve a plan of reorganization, it cannot be enforced in a Section 77 or Chapter X reorganization unless it is, in fact, fair and equitable." 3 . These objections, together with the fact that the standard of fairness and equitableness was incorporated into Section 11, and has been successfully enforced by an administrative agency, strongly indicates, in a standard in the ICC proposal would constitute, as against non-assenters, an unreasonable, and therefore unconstitutional, impairment of contract rights. 11 Whether or not a successful modification were ever accomplished under the statute, enactment would constitute introduction of another incongruity "I into our statutory law of bankruptcy. Accomplishment, under Section 11, of objectives similar to those of the ICC proposal, and without the same dangers, suggests that such incongruity is not necessary.
